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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between interest rates and household saving rates for
an uneven panel of 19 OECD countries during the period 1995 to 2018. Unlike earlier studies,
it uses the pooled mean group (PMG) methodology to investigate which of the interest rate
eects, income or substitution, dominates in the short run, long run, or both periods. With
the baseline estimations, I nd that the income eect outweighs the substitution eect in
the short run, and vice versa in the long run. I also nd that ination (both expected
and actual), household wealth through housing prices, unemployment rate, current taxes
on income and wealth, and general government debt have signicant negative impact on
household saving in the long run. I nd that nancial development has a positive eect on
household saving in the long run. Current taxes on income and wealth has a strong negative
impact on household saving in the short run.
Keywords: household saving, interest rates, ination, taxation, unemployment rate,
dynamic heterogeneous panel data model
JEL codes: E21, E24, E43, C23
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most crucial assumption underlying recent years policy approach of adopting
negative interest rates by some major central banks (see table 1) relates to the commonly
perceived positive interest rate eect on saving. Most economist would share the view
that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can signicantly inuence the consumption
and saving decisions of households. However, they pay lip service to what happens in the
interim regarding the relationship between saving and interest rate, thereby forcing empirical
investigations to focus on long-run estimations and conclusions. In this paper, I do not
attempt to engage in a theoretical discussion of short-run mechanisms. Instead, I examine
∗I thank Paulo Brito, Antonio Afonso and participants of INFER Workshop on New Challenges for Fiscal
Policy for helpful comments and discussions. This paper represents the authors' personal opinions and does
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ect the views of the aliated institution.
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in a dynamic heterogeneous panel framework the short- and long-run impact of interest rate
on household saving. The goal is to test empirically which of the interest rate eects, income
or substitution, dominate in the short- or long-run, or both periods, and to emphasize that
such a distinction can contribute to the identication of most appropriate policy responses
for short- and long-run purposes.
[Table 1 about here.]
Moreover, I examine the impact of other economic factors like ination, taxation, unem-
ployment, nancial development, household wealth and general government debt on house-
hold saving, and whether the empirical results obtained are robust to variables choice and
alternative specications of the model. Given this, I apply the Pooled Mean Group Method
(PMG) proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith [1] to a panel of 19 countries for over two and
a half decades (1995-2018) in order to test these hypotheses. The PMG method uses the
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model as the basic structure in conducting estima-
tions and oers the advantage of being able to detect any long-run equilibrium relationship,
as well as the short-run dynamics.
It is known a priori that two ambiguous forces are likely to interplay when one con-
siders the interest elasticity of saving. The debate on this has long been a severe bone
of contention among economists and policy-makers. Gylfason [2] notes that the classical
view that aggregate saving is an increasing function of the interest rate may not be correct
because the substitution eect and the income eect may go in opposite directions, thus
rendering the net eect ambiguous. Thus, on the one hand, a fall in interest rate renders
future consumption more expensive, hence, can discourage saving (substitution eect) while
on the other hand, can encourage saving at the present as households would require more
money for the same amount of consumption in the future (income eect). In an extremely
low-interest-rate environment such as one faced by some economies today, the income eect
is likely to outweigh the substitution eect. In such a case, for example, individuals may be
worried about the possibility of not being able to meet their planned future objectives such
as pensions, hence, may try to overcome this low return by increasing the aggregate amount
of saving.
The disparities in household saving rates across and within many industrialized and de-
veloping economies overtime, in view of the trends in the nominal interest rates and ination
rates, cast more doubt on the link between the saving rate and interest rate, and calls for the
need to broadly re-examine the factors that impact household saving in the short -and long-
run period. Such disparities may suggest dierent institutional settings and the tendency
of some countries to rely more on foreign savings to nance domestic investments making
these countries more vulnerable to external shocks (Rocher and others [3]). Moreover, a
re-examination of the nexus between household saving rates and other macroeconomic fac-
tors such as interest rate, taxation, government debt et cetera is signicant for assessing the
impact that both monetary and scal policy have on consumption and saving in the short-
and long-run periods.
Previous works focused mainly on the United States and reported mixed evidence of long-
run estimates or some support for positive interest rate eects. This heavy focus of many
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studies on the United States means that much of the existing body of empirical evidence
on saving behaviour has been dominated by the specic characteristics and circumstances
of a single country and may, therefore, lack cross country generality (Zee and Tanzi [4]).
Evidence on short- and long-run estimates of the magnitude of such eects using a panel
data approach is minimal. Also, those studies ignored the signicance of the possibility that
a particular variable, say, the interest rate could exert dierent signicant eects (in terms
of magnitude and sign ) on household saving in the short- or long-run period. Short-run
eects are likewise crucial as long-run eects. For instance, whether policy interest rates
and saving rates have a positive or negative relationship in the short term, also refers to the
kind of impact a monetary policy would have on consumption and saving and is therefore
related to the question of stabilization measures (Aizenman and others [5]). If theoretical
evidence (see, for example, Diamond [6]; Summers [7]; Gylfason [8]) is a guide, then one
would expect that in the long run, the interest rate, saving and capital accumulation will all
be interrelated in a manner such that current consumption and saving would be impacted.
Therefore the interest elasticity of the saving rate can be an essential channel for long-term
economic growth.
I report results which conrms some of the literature ndings and also unveil some novel
features. First and most importantly, given the goal of this paper, I detect that the income
eect of the short-term nominal interest rate dominates the substitution eect in the short
run, and vice versa in the long run. I also nd evidence that almost all the macroeconomic
variables considered in this study impact household saving in the long run. When the
long-term nominal interest rate is used instead of the short-term nominal interest rate, I
nd a consistent positive long-run eect, but no short-run relationship with the household
saving rate. When I examined for the impact of Ination on household saving, I nd that
the ination rate (expected or actual) is inversely related to the household saving rate in
the long run. Household wealth proxied in this study with real housing prices also has an
inverse relationship with the household saving rate in the long run. I also nd that the
unemployment rate, which represents the eect of diminished actual resources, is inversely
related to the household saving rate in the long run.
To examine the eect of government policies on household saving, I extend the con-
ventional approaches, notably by including scal policy variables such as current taxes on
income and wealth, and general government debt in the specication. I nd that these two
variables likewise do have an inverse relationship with household saving rates in the long run.
Availability of domestic credit often associated with nancial development or liberalisation
process is found to be positively related to the household saving rate in the long run, a
result which contradicts with theory, although other empirical studies have reported similar
ndings. Second, among the variables considered, I nd that only the short-term nominal
interest rate and current taxes on income and wealth have signicant short-run eects on
household saving and are robust to alternative specications. The ndings also highlight the
importance of short-run heterogeneous characteristics of the countries in the sample, and
why household saving rates vary across these countries.
This paper makes three signicant contributions to the literature on the determinants of
household saving. First, the novel feature of this study is that more attention is devoted to
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isolate short-run eects from long-run eects in order to test the validity of the hypothesis
that the income eect outweighs the substitution eect in the short run, and vice versa in
the long run. It is one of the few studies to introduce dynamics and to also take into account
the view that the disparities in household saving behaviour might be as a result of diversity
in institutional structures across countries.1 Second, this study is among the few studies,
in a panel framework, to rigorously examine nominal interest rates and the expected rate
of ination consistently in order to obtain reliable estimates of the eects of real interest
rates on household saving. Many of the previous studies only focused on the eects of
real interest rates and ignored expected ination. Third, the study also incorporates other
potential household saving determinants identied by theory but not previously considered
in the empirical literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews previous work
on saving behaviour. Section three presents the empirical strategy and the data used for
estimations. Section four reports the estimation results, and section 5 concludes.
2. Previous Empirical Work on Household Saving Behaviour
Until the mid-twentieth century, the notion that saving is unresponsive to the rate
of interest received widespread acceptance among empirical and policy-oriented macroe-
conomists. Keynes [9], in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, noted
...the main conclusion suggested by experience...that the short-period inu-
ence of the rate of interest on individual spending out of a given income is
secondary and relatively unimportant, except, perhaps, where unusually large
changes are in question (1936, p. 94).
David and Scadding [10] examined "Denison's Law"[11], and reported evidence in support
of the proposition that the gross private saving ratio (GPSR) has been very stable in the
United States except for World War I, World War II, and Great Depression years. The
notion of ultrarationality, in which households subsume corporate and government spending
and saving in their budget decisions, was used to explain the stability of the GPSR despite
the signicant changes in its composition.
Boskin's [12] estimation of interest elasticity of saving parameter value of 0.4 for the
United States changed the narrative and led to a proliferation of studies in the 70s and 80s
questioning Boskin's nding. Summer's argument, based on his life-cycle simulation model
that saving is much more interest-elastic than economist have generally thought to be rekin-
dled the debate, particularly among empirical macroeconomists. Majority of those studies
reported evidence of a positive relationship between aggregate saving and interest rates (see,
for example, Juster and Wachtel [13]; Juster and Taylor [14]; Boskin). Some studies also
1Haque and others, Hüfner and Koske all observe that institutional constraints tend to be more binding
in the short-run and may thus cause saving ratios across countries to respond dierently to changes in the
underlying fundamentals.
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presented evidence of an inverse relationship between saving and interest rate (see, for ex-
ample, Houthakker and Taylor [15]; Weber [16]). The sign and statistical signicance of the
interest rate coecient are quite sensitive to how the interest rate variable is constructed
(Carlino [17]). Estimation results of the impact of other variables on saving say ination,
had often come as a by-product of other studies, with conicting results in a similar manner
as interest rate eect. Howard[18] reported evidence of a positive ination eect on saving
for the United States but found no evidence of interest rate eects. Similarly, Howrey and
Hymans [19] reported evidence of adverse eects of ination on the saving rate and a positive
nexus between saving and ination uncertainty but found no evidence of interest rate eects
on saving rates for the United States.
The studies mentioned above focused on individual country-basis, particularly the United
States. 2 Saving represent household intertemporal decision, often related to life-cycle con-
siderations, the relatively short period for which time-series data is available (often less than
one generation) means that information contained in the data is unlikely to be rich enough
to adequately capture the inuences on lifetime saving decisions (Callen and Thimann [20]).
Panel approaches, through the inclusion of many countries of dierent saving characteristics,
have the advantage over individual country time-series studies, of being able to overcome
this problem, and can lead to a more precise parameter estimation. However, most panel
studies in the early 90s focused on the relationship between growth and aggregate private
saving behaviour (see, for example, Carroll and Weil [21]; Attanasio and others [22]). Panel
studies of the relationship between the interest rate and saving began somehow in the late
90s and are very limited.
From a theoretical point of view, based either on the permanent income or the life cycle
hypothesis, the sign of the eect on saving of many of these macroeconomic variables is
ambiguous. Therefore heavy reliance is placed on empirical ndings to throw more light
on the issue. However, empirical studies dier in terms of the country sample, estimation
method, and more importantly, the denition and proxies for the variables used, and as a
result, have led to conicting ndings. These disparate results highlight the challenge in
understanding and estimating the relationship between saving and macroeconomic factors.
A selective summary of some empirical evidence in Table 2 indicates mixed ndings regarding
the relationship between saving and its determinants. 3
[Table 2 about here.]
Some studies (see Schmidt and others [23]; Edwards [24]) nd evidence of no eect of
real interest rate on saving. Callen and Thimann study a panel of 21 OECD countries
and nd important roles for public and private saving, taxes, real interest rate, ination,
unemployment, demography, and nancial deregulation in inuencing household saving.
Masson and others [25] examine a panel of industrial and developing countries and nd that
the government's scal position, GDP as well as per capita income growth, the real interest
2See Gylfason (1981) for a tabulated historical overview of the eects of interest rates and ination on
aggregate consumption and saving in the United States.
3See Hüfner and Koske for an overview of the determinants of household saving rates in panel studies.
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rate, ination, demographics and changes in terms of trade all do have signicant eects on
household saving rates, although the results dier for the two sets of countries considered in
their study.
Bandiera and others [26] nd for a panel of eight developing countries that real interest
rate and ination positively inuences saving, whiles nancial liberalisation have detrimental
eects. Loayza and others [27] report evidence of negative nancial liberalisation eect,
positive ination eect, and negative eect of real interest rate on private saving. De Mello
and others [28] for a panel of 21 OECD countries conrm the relevance of scal policy for
private saving decisions. They further nd wealth eects, through rising equity and housing
prices, to have an essential complementary impact on private saving. Horioka and Wan [29]
nd evidence of a positive eect on the saving rate of real interest rate and ination. Saloti
[30] focuses on the role of wealth and nd for a panel of 18 countries that wealth negatively
impacts household saving.
Ferrucci and Miralles [31] nd public-sector saving rates, the demographic structure of
the population (as measured by the old-age dependency ratio), the growth rate of labour
productivity, changes in terms of trades and the real interest rates to signicantly inuence
private-sector saving rates in OECD economies. Nabur [32] examine provincial data for
China between 1996 and 2009 and nd household saving to respond negatively to a change
in the real interest rate. They claim that Chinese households are target level savers. Mody
and others [33] nd for a panel of advanced economies that the real interest rate, and labour
income uncertainty, measured in terms of the unemployment rate have signicant adverse
eects, whiles the net nancial worth have positive eects on household saving.
Haque and others [34] criticise majority of the studies mentioned above on their parame-
ter homogeneity assumption across countries regarding the inuence of explanatory variables
and lack of modelling dynamics. They argue that this may lead to misleading inferences
about the key determinants of saving.4 Their result indicate that scal variables, particu-
larly the general government surplus as a proportion of GDP and the ratio of government
consumption to GDP, as well as the terms of trade, are the critical determinants of private
saving rates in the industrial countries in the post World War II period.
Given the criticism by Haque and others, of neglected heterogeneity and dynamics in
cross country saving regressions of previous works, some studies estimate country-by-country
relationship, without pooling (e.g. Bandiera and others; Ferrucci and Miralles, though they
maintain the homogeneity restrictions for the long-run coecients). A study by Hüfner
and Koske [35]) allows for heterogeneity in the long- and short-run parameters across G7
countries in their specication, and explicitly distinguishes between nancial liberalisation
eects and wealth eects. They nd that income development as well as real interest rates
and ination inuence household savings in most of the countries, and that wealth eects
through housing and stock prices play a role in many countries.
The approach of this paper in distinguishing among short- and long-run eects is in line
4Haque and others show that ignoring cross-country dierences can result in the overestimation of the
eects of certain factors on the private saving rates and at the same time obtain highly signicant, but
spurious, non linear eects for some of the potential determinants.
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with the contributions by Haque and others and is shared by De Serres and Pelgrin [36],
who allow for country-specic short-and long-run coecients for those variables where homo-
geneity is rejected. De Serres and Pelgrin nd that public-sector saving rates, demographics
(as measured by the old-age dependency ratio), the growth rate of labour productivity,
changes in terms of trades and the real interest rates have all been signicant in inuencing
private-sector saving rates in OECD countries.
A recent study by Aizenman and others use an uneven panel of 138 countries to investi-
gate the link between interest rate and private saving. They nd evidence of a substitution
eect, although its estimate is signicant only for the full sample and marginal for the sub-
sample of Asian economies. 5 Given this result, they conduct further investigations to nd
whether the real interest rate aects private saving dierently depending on whether the
real, or nominal, interest rate is below a certain threshold. They nd evidence that the
impact of the real interest rate on private saving changes when the nominal interest rate is
below a relatively low level, suggesting that a low-interest-rate environment can yield dier-
ent eects on private saving across country groups under dierent economic environments.
They did not provide an empirical estimate to support this proposition. This paper goes a
step further to explore some validity of their key ndings and to test the hypothesis that
the eect could likewise vary in dierent periods, short- and long-run period, in particular.
3. Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1. The Data Set and Stylized Facts
This study uses annual data set comprising of 19 OECD countries (see Appendix A
for the list of countries) and spans the period 1995 - 2018. These countries were selected
in order to construct a panel that possesses dierent characteristics. The description of
the variables (dependent variable: real gross household saving rate (srg) and explanatory
variables: short-term nominal interest rate (isn), expected rate of ination (πe ), real housing
prices (hpr), current taxes on income and wealth (t), unemployment rate (u), domestic credit
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (dcr) and general government gross debt (as
a percentage of GDP(gd)) can be found in Appendix B at the back of the paper. The
primary sources of the data include the annual macro-economic database of the European
Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Aairs (AMECO), OECD
database and World Development Indicator database. I follow the approach of Gylfason to
construct series for the one-year expected rate of ination and the actual rate of ination
(see Appendix B for a description of the procedures used) 6. A detailed descriptive statistic
can be found in Table 3. The table present mean values of the variables, along with standard
deviations, for the full sample period.
[Table 3 about here.]
5See Azienman and others for a detailed discussion of the theoretical predictions of private saving.
6See Gylfason for an elaborative procedure and defence of the use of adaptive expectations rather than
rational expectations. Although, a market based expected ination is preferable, survey data is not available
for all countries in the panel, hence, the use of adaptive expectation method.
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Table 4 shows the average household saving rate for 19 OECD countries considered in
this study, as well as the European Union (EU) average. One could notice the disparities
in average household saving rates across these countries, with 12 of these countries having
household saving rates below the EU average rate of 11.3 percent. Switzerland, Luxembourg,
Germany, Belgium and Austria are the top ve countries, with household saving rates above
15 percent whiles Greece remains at the bottom of the ranking.
[Table 4 about here.]
Figure B.1 shows the trends in the mean of the variables for the panel over the sample pe-
riod 1995-20018. Panel(a) shows that the real gross household saving rate has been trending
downwards from about 18.8 percent in 1995 to about 10.4 percent by 2018. A similar trend
could be noticed of the average EU household saving rate, which dipped below 10 percent in
the year 2017 and is showing sign of improvement. The average short-term nominal interest
rate for the panel has also been trending downwards and has neared zero in recent times.
One could notice the sharp drop in the short-term nominal interest, a stabilization measures
adopted by policy-makers in response to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. Panel
(b) shows that the long-term nominal interest rate has also been trending downwards and
is now a little above 12 percent. An inspection of other for other macroeconomic variables
(see other graphs in Figure B.1) considered in this study provides more highlights about
some of the stylized facts known in the literature regarding the relationship between these
variables and household saving rates. Some of the variables, for example, current taxes on
income and wealth (Panel (d)), and general government gross wealth (Panel (f)) have all
been stable in recent years. The rate of expected and actual ination (Panel (c)) shows
signs of uctuations, but stable over time. The average unemployment rate (Panel (e)) after
attaining high levels during and after the GFC period has been on a continuous decline since
2013. Domestic credit to the private (Panel (g)) sector has been on a continuous decline for
some time now while real housing prices (Panel (h)) has been trending upwards.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3.1.1. Panel Unit Root Test
I employ panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin and Chu [37] and Im, Pesaran, and Shin [38]
in order to determine the stationarity properties of the variables. The Levin, Lin and Chu
procedure tests the hypothesis that all cross-sectional units are stationary with the same
autoregressive parameter across units (the homogeneous alternative hypothesis) against the
hypothesis that they are all non-stationary. On the other hand, the test by Im, Pesaran,
and Shin procedure allows for residual serial correlation and heterogeneous dynamics and
error variances across units. In such a case, some variables for individual units may be
stationary. The result of these test are likely to be inuenced by the chosen number of lag
length, therefore, a common lag length of one was used. The tests are estimated both in
levels and rst dierences, with and without a trend. Table B.5 reports the results of the
tests. Except for real household gross saving rate, unemployment rate, ination rate (both
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expected and actual) that are I(0) in levels under the two tests, the rest of the variables are
I(0) in rst dierence, suggesting a stationary cointegrating relation among the variables.
[Table 5 about here.]
3.2. Empirical Strategy
I estimate a saving function which is consistent with both the permanent income hypoth-
esis (PIH) and the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH). Since the goal of this study is to test the
hypothesis of which of the interest rate eect, income or substitution, is likely to dominate
in the short- or long-run, or both periods, I apply the PMG method proposed by Pesaran
and others to distinguish short-term eects from long-run eect. The PMG estimator is an
intermediate estimator between the Dynamic Fixed Eect (DFE) estimator and the Mean
Group (MG) estimators since it involves a mixture of pooling and averaging which allows
the intercepts, short-run coecients, and error variances to be dierent across groups, but
imposes homogeneity on the long-run coecients across groups. One major of PMG over
traditional dynamic xed eect model is that it is possible to allow the short-run dynamic
specication to dier from country to country. The underlying assumptions of the PMG
estimator are as follows: rst, the error terms are serially uncorrelated and are distributed
independently of the regressors, that is, the explanatory variables can be treated as ex-
ogenous; second, there is a long-run relationship between the dependent and explanatory
variables; and third, the long-run parameters are the same across countries.7 I assume the
long-run savings function is given by:




it + θ2ihprit + uit, i = 1, 2, . . . N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (1)
where srg is the real gross saving rate, isn is the short-term nominal interest rate, πe is
one-year expected ination rate, and hpr is real housing prices as a proxy for wealth.
For simplicity, I assume a common maximum lag of one for both the dependent and inde-
pendent variable, which leads to an autoregressive distributed lag model ( ARDL (1,1,1,1))
that can be written as:












The error correction equation is derived as:
∆srgit = φi
(
















, φi = λi − 1 (4)
7See Pesaran and others (1999) for an elaborative discussion of the PMG estimation method.
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Equation (3) is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure described
by Pesaran and others. The estimated coecients are obtained using the Newton-Raphson
algorithm, which uses both rst and second derivatives of the log-likelihood function. The
mean group estimates are used as initial estimates for the long-run parameters of the pooled
maximum likelihood estimation. For long-run equilibrium to exist and convergence to take
place, the estimated error correction adjustment term in equation (3), φi is required to
be negative and signicant. Although this estimation procedure allows one to choose lag
structures based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian
Criterion (SBC), I restrict the model to a maximum lag of one, and the results are presented
in the next section that follows. Given the fact that T is relatively small (T=24), I do




The rst regression results are given in Table B.6. The rst column reports the results of
a basic estimation where real gross saving rate, srg, is exclusively explained by the short-term
nominal interest rate, isn.8 The result indicate the existence of income eect (negative) in the
short run and a substitution eect (positive) in the long-run period.9 The error correction
coecient is around -0.31 and is highly signicant. In the second column, I add the one-year
expected rate of ination, as a measure of uncertainty, to the basic specication. The result
in terms of the expected signs in both periods remain the same, with the negative value of
the error correction term increasing to -0.34, and the coecient of the short-term nominal
interest rate increasing from previous estimate of 0.39 to 0.43. In the third column, I add real
housing prices to capture wealth eects. I use this model as a benchmark model and refer
to it throughout the rest of the analysis. Again, as in the previous two models, I detect the
existence of income and substitution eect in the short- and long-run period, respectively.
The average error correction coecient is now -0.36 and is highly signicant. This implies
that any deviation of the real gross saving rate from the value predicted by the long-run
relationship with the short-term nominal interest rate, expected rate of ination and real
housing prices triggers a change in the opposite direction in the real gross saving rate. The
long-run coecients of the interest rate, expected rate of ination and real housing prices
are now 0.35, -0.22 and -0.013, respectively, and are all signicant. However, the coecient
of the expected rate of ination is marginally signicant in the short-run, whiles that of real
housing prices is not to signicant.
[Table 6 about here.]
8The approach is to start with a trivial regression and observe the results of subsequent addition of other
variables. However, for some cases I present the baseline result directly.
9Caution must be taken in comparing these results with other panel studies which uses the real interest
in its estimation.
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The estimations of the short-run country-specic coecients are reported in Table B.7.
All countries have the expected sign of the error correction coecients except Sweden. The
fastest adjustments are Norway φ̂ = −0.77 whiles Belgium is the slowest with φ̂ = −0.09.
The country-specic short-run estimates also show that for 14 countries out of a total of
19, there is a signicant relationship between the short-term nominal interest rates and
household saving. Signicant short-run substitution eect can only be found for Sweden.
Moreover, the magnitude, sign and the signicance of the one-year expected ination rate,
as well as wealth eects through real housing prices vary across countries. These variations
in results reect dierent institutional frameworks across countries.
[Table 7 about here.]
4.2. Further Results
In this section, I present further empirical evidence by testing whether the results pre-
sented in the previous section are sensitive to the choice of variables (real gross saving rate
versus real net saving rate; expected versus the actual rate of ination; short-term nominal
interest rate versus long-term nominal interest rate).
4.2.1. Real Gross Saving Rate versus Real Net Saving Rate
Columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table B.6 reports estimation result when the real net saving
rate of households (srn) was used as the dependent variable. These results are quite similar
to the previously reported ones, with the error correction coecient of -0.34 and is highly
signicant. The long-run coecients of interest rate, rate of one-year expected ination
and real housing prices are now 0.39, -0.19 and -0.01, respectively. The short-run estimates
are now -0.36, 0.10 and 0.02 respectively. These coecients are signicant in both short-
and long-run period except real housing prices, which is not signicant. Again, this result
indicates that the hypothesis that the income eect outweighs the substitution eect in the
short run and vice versa, in the long run, is by so far robust to an alternative denition of
the dependent variable.
4.2.2. Expected versus Actual Rate of Ination
When the one-year expected rate of ination is made equal to the actual rate (i.e. λ = 1),
the actual rate of ination replaces the expected rate in the estimating equation. The
equations are then re-estimated and the results reported in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table
B.8. The error correction term is now -0.45 and is highly signicant. For the baseline
results (column 2, with real gross saving rate as the dependent variable), the estimated long-
run coecients of the interest rate, ination rate and real housing prices are signicantly
now 0.831, -0.378 and -0.027, respectively, compared with 0.35, -0.22 and -0.01 of previous
estimates. The short-run coecients are now -0.46, 0.06 and 0.03, respectively (real housing
prices was found not). Column 4 of Table B.8 reports the results when real net saving is
used as the dependent variable. Similarly, as in the previous model, all long-run coecients
are highly signicant and have the expected signs. However, the result diers in terms of
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magnitude. The coecients of the interest rate, ination rate and real housing prices are
now 1.037, -0.20 and -0.04, respectively. Likewise, the short-run coecients dier and are
now -0.63, 0.04 and 0.01, respectively. Only the coecient of the interest rate variable is
robust in terms of short-run signicance. The error correction term remains the same and is
highly signicant. 10 Overall, these results again indicate that the income eect outweighs
the substitution eect in the short run and vice versa in the long run.
[Table 8 about here.]
4.2.3. Short-term versus Long-term Nominal Interest Rate
When the models were re-estimated with the long-term nominal interest rate instead
of the short-term nominal interest, signicant long-run results similar in terms of expected
signs were obtained.11 The results are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table B.9 for the
case where the real gross saving rate is used as the dependent variable, and in columns 4,
5, and 6 when the real net saving rate is used. The error correction coecient is now -0.38
as compared to -0.36 obtained from the equation with the short-term nominal interest rate
whiles the long-run coecients of the long-term nominal interest rate, the expected ination
and real housing prices are now 0.36, -0.13 and -0.01, respectively, compared with 0.35,
-0.22 and -0.01. In terms of the short-run coecients, the estimates were consistent in terms
of the expected sign but were not statistically signicant across all specications. Results
within close ranges were obtained when the real net saving rate was used as the dependent
variable. These results conrm the existence of substitution eects in the long-run, but the
income eect cannot be conrmed in the short run, although expected signs were obtained.
[Table 9 about here.]
4.3. Sensitivity to other Determinants of Household Saving
The purpose of this section is to conduct further investigations by introducing into the
baseline specication other macroeconomic variables that determines household saving, rst,
to check if their inclusion in the model changes the results previously obtained, thus, if
income eect will still dominate the substitution eect in the short run, and second, to
observe the impact each variable on the real gross saving rate. The variables are rst added
separately into the baseline specication, results are reported in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Table B.10 and later altogether, as reported in columns 5 and 6. 12 13.
10The standard errors of the parameter estimates are a bit higher which suggest this equation might not
t the data quite well, as compared with model estimated with expected rate of ination.
11The use of long-term nominal interest rates here is merely a distinct empirical exercise and should not
to be viewed as a substitute for the short-term nominal interest rate in the hypothesis testing. Monetary
policy is generally presumed to have a limited impact on the long-term rates.
12I do not simultaneously add more than three policy variables to the benchmark model in order to ensure
sucient number of degrees of freedom.
13See Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén, for a tabulated long list of variables with their expected sign
as well as the results of 16 panel studies of private saving
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4.3.1. Current Taxes on Income and Wealth
Taxes, particularly on income and wealth distort households economic decisions, as it
depresses income and wealth, hence, saving.14 The question of which forms of taxes are
more or less distortionary, although an empirical one, have not received much attention
in the empirical literature as compare to theoretical simulations. When current taxes on
income and wealth is added to the baseline specication, again, I nd that the income eect
dominates the substitution eect in the short run, and vice versa in the long-run. The results
are reported in column 1 of Table B.10. However, I observe a substantial increase in the
long-run interest rate coecient. The long-run coecients of the other variables, as well as
the error correction coecient, are of the expected sign and are highly signicant, except
real housing prices which the sign changes from negative in previous estimates to positive.
I nd a statistically signicant and strong negative relationship between current taxes on
income and wealth and household saving rates in both the short- and long-run periods. The
estimated coecients are -0.96 and -0.84 in the long- and short-run period, respectively.
This result is consistent with previous studies (see, for example Tanzi and Zee) that focused
solely on the impact of taxes on household saving and found estimated coecients to be
high and negative.
4.3.2. Unemployment Rate
In order to capture the eect of uncertainty about labour income prospects, unemploy-
ment rates in levels were included. Unemployment rates together with the rate of ination
(which represents the eect of diminished actual resources) create an unusual degree of un-
certainty for households. These two variables are used as proxies for general measures of
uncertainty.15 Column 2 of Table B.10 reports the result when the unemployment rate is
added to the baseline specication.16 The long-run coecients for the interest rate and real
housing prices are now 0.4 and -0.02, respectively and are all signicant. The error correction
coecient, in comparison with previously obtained results, is also within the expected range
(-0.3 to -0.4 approximately). Both measures of uncertainty, namely, the rate of ination and
unemployment rate negatively impact household saving in the long run, with coecients of
-0.22 and -0.16, respectively. These negative long-run coecients of the general measures of
uncertainty suggest that the "income eect" dominates the "substitution eect". Thus, an
increase in unemployment reduces household saving, through a reduction in income, whiles
ination diminishes actual resources. I nd no evidence of any signicant short-run impact of
these variables on real gross saving. The signicance of the short-run coecients is aected
by the introduction of the unemployment rate variable.
14Consumption tax if it is linear, does not distort household's intertemporal decision. Wage and capital
income taxes do inuence household's intertemporal saving and consumption decisions.
15See, for example, Howard; Howrey and Hymens; and Mason and others for a detailed discussion on the
ambiguous eects of these variables.)
16Note that the one-year expected rate of ination is already part of the baseline specication.
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4.3.3. Domestic Credit to the Private Sector (as a percentage of GDP)
The expected sign of nancial development is ambiguous. On the one hand, nancial
development could raise saving through the development of deep and well regulated nancial
systems. On the other hand, nancial investments are part of household wealth, and a more
developed nancial and capital markets boost household demand for instruments and lessen
the need for precautionary saving, which could lower household saving. Column 3 of Table
B.10 reports the result after the inclusion of the nancial development variable. I nd
that, upon inclusion of a nancial development measure, the income eect dominates the
substitution eect in the short run, and vice versa in the long run. The short-run interest
rate coecient is now -0.53, highly signicant and higher than previously estimated ones.
The error correction coecient is highly signicant and negative, as expected. I also nd
that the nancial development measure is a positive contributor to household saving in the
long run. This indicates that nancial development may be associated with more ecient
capital markets or nancial system leading to higher expected returns and an inducement of
saving. The coecient of the one-year expected ination rate is signicant in both periods,
negative in the long run, but positive in the short run. Real housing prices is not statistically
signicant in both periods.
4.3.4. General Government Debt (as a percentage of GDP)
In the absence of a full Ricardian oset, government debt should have an impact on the
level of interest rates, and should ordinarily drive households concern about the possibility
of future higher taxes. The baseline specication is extended by general government gross
debt as a share of GDP to capture Ricardian equivalence eects (REH). Column 4 of Table
B.10 reports the estimation result. Income eect still dominates the substitution eect in
the short run, and vice versa in the long run. The long- and short-run coecients of interest
rate are now 0.57 and -0.50, respectively, and are all highly signicant. The error correction
coecient is now -0.47 and also highly signicant. The general government debt variable
is highly signicant and negatively related to the household saving rate in the long run,
but the short-run coecient is negative and marginally signicant. The coecients of the
one-year expected ination rate and real housing prices are negative and highly signicant
in the long run, but not statistically signicant in the short run.
Columns 5 of Table B.10 reports the results of a simultaneous introduction of two vari-
ables, namely, current taxes on income and wealth, and unemployment rate into the baseline
specication. The income eect still dominates the substitution eect in the short-run, and
vice versa in the long run. The error correction term is now -0.53 and is highly signicant
as expected. Current taxes on income and wealth strongly and negatively impact household
saving in both periods. The one-year expected rate of ination, real housing prices, unem-
ployment rate and general government gross debt all signicantly impact household saving
in the long run but not in the short-run period.
Column 6 of Table B.10 reports the result of the simultaneous addition of three policy
variables, namely, current taxes on income and wealth, unemployment rate and the general
government debt into the baseline model. Again, the income eect rules over the substitution
eect in the short run, and vice versa in the long run. The long- and short-run coecients
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are now 0.69 and -0.52, respectively. The error correction coecient increased from the
previous range (between -0.3 and -0.5) to -0.60, the highest so far. The long-run results of
the one-year expected rate of ination, real housing prices, unemployment rate and general
government gross debt are as expected, except that the coecient of the unemployment rate
is now positive. Just like the previously obtained short-run results presented in column 5,
only the coecients of current taxes on income and wealth, and the interest rate remains
signicant.
[Table 10 about here.]
4.4. Diagnostics
This section discusses some econometric test applied to individual country equations
before proceeding to assess the robustness of the benchmark model. The test results for
Godfrey's test of residual serial correlation, Ramsey's RESET test of functional form, Jarque-
Bera's test of normality of regression residuals and Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity
are reported in Table B.11. Two countries, Austria and France, suer from serial correlation.
Austria also shows evidence of misspecication of the functional form. Austria and Sweden
show evidence of non-normal errors. There is also evidence of heteroskedasticity in 12
out of the 19 countries. Heterogeneous panels, in general, tend to show some signs of
heteroskedasticity in the errors. Because the analysis is conducted on panel data, the overall
t is good for the country-specic regressions.
[Table 11 about here.]
For a graphical representation of the model t for individual countries, see graphs (a)
to (d) of Figures B.2, B.3, and B.4. The graphs shows the actual household saving rate
with the tted values generated by the full model as well as the tted values based on the
long-run equation. The graphs show that the PMG model describes the saving rate very
well for almost all the countries in this study, except for Luxembourg.
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
The equation for each country was estimated, allowing the lag order to be chosen by
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) in each country, with a maximum common lag
of 1.17 The long-run estimated coecients for each country are reported in Table B. 12.
17AIC is more reliable than a xed lag, thus, ARDL (1,1,1,1) since T is small in this study. Moreover,
estimations with a common ARDL (1,1,1,1) showed more evidence of misspecication than when the lag
was chosen by AIC.
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The results indicate that ARDL (1,1,00) was chosen for 6 countries , ARDL (1,1,0,1) for 4
countries, ARDL (1,0,0,0) for 4 countries, ARDL (1,0,0,1) for 2 countries, ARDL (1,1,1,1)
for 1 country, ARDL (1,0,1,0) for one country, and ARDL (1,1,1,0) for 1 country. The
estimated φi is less than -0.2 in all countries. Austria and Luxembourg have the fastest
adjustment, whereas Portugal, United Kingdom and Finland have the slowest adjustment.
These country-specic long-run slope coecients dier considerably in terms of the sign,
magnitude and statistical signicance. Due to the paucity of time-series observations for
each country, these country-specic long-run estimates are not that informative and should
be interpreted with caution. However, meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the error
correction terms, which ranges from -0.3 to -1, are signicant.
[Table 12 about here.]
5. Conclusion
Recent years trends in household saving rates seem dramatic, especially when one con-
siders the adoption of near-zero, zero and negative interest-rate policies by some central
banks. This has left policy-makers and some economists in doubt regarding the eectiveness
of such policy approaches. The question of to what extent do households change their saving
or consumption in response to a change in the interest rate has often been the central topic
of policy debates. This paper test the hypothesis of which of the short-term nominal interest
rate eects, namely, income (negative) or substitution (positive), is likely to dominate in
the short run, long run, or both periods. For this reason, I applied the Pooled Mean Group
estimator (PMG) to a dynamic heterogeneous panel data model in order to test this hypoth-
esis. From the baseline estimations, I nd that the income eect outweighs the substitution
eect in the short run, and vice versa in the long run. Several model specications, primarily
through the inclusion of other determinants of household saving as explanatory variables,
and through the alternative denition of the dependent variable generally did not alter the
result. Country-specic short-term estimates armed this nding.
I also nd that ination (both expected and actual), household wealth through real hous-
ing prices, current taxes on income and wealth, unemployment rate and general government
gross debt all have a signicant negative impact on household saving in the long run. The
results also suggest that nancial development proxied with domestic credit to the private
sector have a positive impact on household saving in the long-run period. I nd that current
taxes on income and wealth have a signicant negative eect on household saving in the
short-run. However, I do not nd evidence of any signicant impact of real housing prices,
unemployment rate, nancial development and general government debt on household saving
in the short-run period.
We could draw some few lessons from these ndings. First, the results lessen the burden
of monetary policy-makers considering moving rates into zero or negative territories since
these results provide evidence that there is a signicant link between the short-term nominal
interest rate and household saving rate in both the short run and the long run. Second, the
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evidence that the income eect prevails over the substitution eect in the short run seems
to suggest that a large proportion of households are liquidity constrained.
The sign and magnitude of interest rate eect on saving in the short and long run
depend on the osetting inuences of the substitution and income eects. The strength of
this eect depends on both the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution and the proportion of
households who face liquidity constraint. Consider a fall in interest rate, for example, which
lowers the cost of current consumption relative to future consumption, thereby providing an
incentive to increase consumption and lower saving (substitution eect). The fall in interest
rate also means that household's future labour income is worth more in the present time,
hence, should lead to lower household saving (human wealth eect, which is also a particular
type of income eect). In such a case, if the household is a net creditor, then it now receives
less interest income for the same amount of saving, which makes it consume less in the
present as well as in all future periods, thereby raising current saving. From this analysis,
one would expect that the relationship between saving and interest rate should be negative.
If the household is a net debtor ( young households, in particular, are expected to be
substantial net debtors for many years), then the lower interest rate should result in a low
saving. Moreover, it is often argued that low interest rate environment, like in recent times,
generates a feeling of uncertainty of future economic (monetary or nancial ) conditions
which tends to encourage people to engage in precautionary saving. In such cases, we will
expect a positive relationship between the interest rate and saving unless households are
liquidity constrained in some form. The long-run results from this study support these
propositions. However, the short-run estimates indicate that the income eect dominates
the substitution eect in the short run. This seems to suggest that a signicant proportion
of households face liquidity constraint in the short-run period.
Therefore, from a policy standpoint, this nding is crucial as any policy geared towards
inuencing the real side of the economy might not generate the desired outcomes that it
seeks if a signicant portion of households are liquidity constrained. Even for the best-
case scenario of assuming perfect capital markets, households could still face other forms
of liquidity constraint that results from institutional frameworks that theoretical models
may fail to capture. Empirical studies have neglected short-run eects and focused on long-
run estimations and conclusions. This study highlights the point that short-run income
eects are not of low order of importance and should be taken into consideration in policy
discussions.
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Appendix B. Data Descriptions and Sources
Real Gross Saving Rate (in percent of gross disposable income) - srgit : Saving
of households and non-prot institutions serving households (NPISH) without deducting
consumption of xed capital and deated by the price deator private nal consumption
expenditure. Source: AMECO database.
Real Net Saving Rate (in percent of gross disposable income) - srnit : Saving
of households and non-prot institutions serving households (NPISH) after deducting
consumption of xed capital and deated by the private nal consumption expenditure.
Source: AMECO database.
Short-term Nominal Interest Rate - isnit : Mainly policy interest rates or 3-months
money market rates. Source: AMECO database.
Long-term Nominal Interest Rate - ilnit : Mainly Central Government bonds of over
10 years. Source: AMECO database.
Long-term Real Interest Rate - ilrit : Long-term nominal interest rate (iln) adjusted
for price deator private nal consumption expenditure. Source: AMECO database.
Unemployment Rate - uit : Share of the total active population (labour force).
Source: AMECO database.
Current Taxes on Income and Wealth - tit : Comprise taxes on income from
employment, property, entrepreneurship, pensions, etc., including taxes deducted by em-
ployers (PAYE taxes) and other current taxes on capital, poll taxes, levied per adult or
per household, independently of income or wealth, expenditure taxes, payable on the total
expenditures of persons or households. Source: AMECO database.
General Government Gross Debt- gdit : General government net nancial liabilities
as percent of GDP. Source: AMECO database. Given the lack of general public debt
data for some countries such as Switzerland, central government debt data is used as an
alternative.
Domestic credit to private sector (as a percentage of GDP - dcrit) : Financial
resources provided to the private sector by nancial corporations, such as through loans,
purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that
establish a claim for repayment. Source: IMF, IFS, and World Bank and OECD GDP
estimates.
Real Housing Price Index - hprit : Nominal house price indices deated by the
consumer price index. Source: OECD Analytical database.
19
Expected Ination - πeit : Computed (on the assumption of adaptive expectations of
price expectations) from the annual rate of change (∆pcdef) of the price deator private
nal consumption expenditure (pcdef) in per cent per annum with adjustment weights (λ)
varying from 0.1 to 1. Series with the best prediction of dpcd was used as expected rate of
ination:
πeit = λ∆pcdefit + (1 − λ)πeit−1 (B.1)
Rate of Ination - πit : Computed as annual rate of change of the price deator private
nal consumption expenditure (pcd) in percent per annum:
πit = 100.0 ∗ ((pcdit/ pcdit-1) − 1)
Similar results could be obtained with:
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Table (B.1) Some Central Banks with Negative Interest Rate Policy
Central Bank Date of Policy Adoption
1. Danmarks Nationalbank July 2012
2. European Central Bank (ECB) June 2014
3. Swiss National Bank (SNB) January 2015
4. Sveriges Riksbank (Swedish) February 2015
5. Bank of Japan January 2016
6. National Bank of Hungary (NBH)a March 2016
Notes:
a) NBH introduced negative rate on overnight deposits.
.
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Table (B.2) Summary of Some Panel Studies on Saving Behaviour
Study Data Type Real Interest rate Ination Unemployment Taxes Credit to GDP Wealth Government Debt
1. Corsetti et al (1992) HS NS NEG - - - NEG -
2. Edwards (1996) PS NS NS - - POS NEG NS
3. Callenn and Thimann (1997) HSD POS POS NEG NEG NEG - -
4. Masson et al. (1998) PSD POS POS - - - POS -
5. Haque et al. (1999) PSD N.S N.S - - - N.S -
6. Bandiera et al. (2000) PSD POS POS - - - - -
7. Loayza et al. (2000) PSD NEG POS - - NEG - -
8. De Serres and Pelgrin(2003) PSD NEG N.S - - -
9. De Mello et al. (2004) PSD NEG N.S - - - NEG NEG
10. Horioka and Wan (2007) HSD POS POS - - - - -
11. Ferrucci and Miralles (2007) PSD POS - - NEG - - -
12. Salotti (2010) HSD - - - - - NEG -
13. Nabar (2011) HSD NEG POS - - - NEG -
14. Mody et al. (2012) HSD POS - POS - NEG NEG -
15. Aizenman et al. (2019) PSD POS - - - NEG - -
Notes:
a) HSD = Household Saving Data, PSD = Private Saving Data and the sign of the estimated coecients
are given by: POS = Positive, NEG = Negative, N.S = Non-Signicance.
b) Explanatory variables diers across studies; hence, the variables used for the table have been generally
categorized to provide some useful insights.
.
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Table (B.3) Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation
srg 12.23 32.23 -11.96 6.18
srn 6.11 27.49 -18.26 6.67
isn 3.07 27.59 -0.50 3.48
iln 4.24 22.50 -0.05 2.58
u 7.59 27.50 1.90 4.32
t 10.41 29.99 3.88 4.73
gd 70.55 236.71 6.94 41.93
dcr 112.09 312.02 12.89 46.90
hpr 94.77 175.15 32.38 25.40
πe 1.87 20.47 -26.86 4.33
π 1.75 20.82 -30.31 4.71
Note:
See appendix B for a description and sources of the variables.
.
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The horizontal lines in the middle of the table split the table into categories of countries with average
household real gross saving rates (in percent of real gross disposable) above and below European Union
(EU) average for the full sample period 1995-2018.
.
26
Table (B.5) Unit Root Test
Constant Constant and Linear trend
Variable Test Level 1st Dierence Level 1st Dierence
srg Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -3.331∗∗∗ -9.238∗∗∗ -2.910∗∗ -6.988∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -1.910∗ -10.390∗∗∗ -3.276∗∗∗ -7.664∗∗∗
srn Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -2.723∗∗ -7.831 ∗∗∗ -1.931∗ -5.315∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -1.298 -9.504∗∗∗ -2.819∗∗ -6.667∗∗∗
isn Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -3.584∗∗∗ -13.791∗∗∗ -5.069∗∗∗ -11.992∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -1.112 -9.598∗∗∗ -5.746∗∗∗ -12.218∗∗∗
iln Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -2.726∗∗ -8.649∗∗∗ -2.680∗∗ -6.814∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -0.743 -9.213∗∗∗ -4.685∗∗∗ -5.934∗∗∗
u Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -4.158∗∗∗ -6.885∗∗∗ -2.891∗∗∗ -5.108∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -4.652∗∗∗ -6.786∗∗∗ -3.928∗∗∗ -3.752∗∗∗
t Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -1.830∗ -8.896∗∗∗ -2.059∗ -7.238∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -1.957∗ -8.662∗∗∗ -1.534 -6.641∗∗∗
gd Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -2.499∗∗ -3.860∗∗∗ -3.004∗∗ -1.440
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) 0.063 -4.144∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗ -1.211∗∗
dcr Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -5.002∗∗∗ -4.446∗∗∗ -2.387∗∗ -4.446∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -1.469 -4.243∗∗∗ 1.813 -4.243∗∗∗
hpr Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -4.196∗∗∗ -4.053 ∗∗∗ -3.843∗∗∗ -2.976 ∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -1.080 -3.639 ∗∗∗ -0.911 -2.416∗∗
πe Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -13.639∗∗∗ -21.649∗∗∗ -13.907∗∗∗ -17.461∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -11.983∗∗∗ -20.448∗∗∗ -12.030∗∗∗ -16.917∗∗∗
π Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) -7.746∗∗∗ -11.484∗∗∗ -4.860∗∗∗ -7.662∗∗∗
Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) -9.725∗∗∗ -18.285∗∗∗ -8.054∗∗∗ -15.301∗∗∗
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 denote rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 10%, 5%, and
1% signicance level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Error-correction (coecient):
φi −0.313∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.360∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.048) (0.053) (0.044) (0.044) (0.058)
Long-run eect (coecients):
isn 0.387∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.070) (0.054) (0.087) (0.084) (0.071)
πe −0.285∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗ −0.190∗∗




∆ isn −0.263∗ −0.326∗∗ −0.329∗∗ −0.324∗∗ −0.364∗∗ −0.364∗∗
(0.119) (0.122) (0.107) (0.111) (0.130) (0.111)
∆ πe 0.053 0.063∗ 0.069 0.101∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.046) (0.045)
∆ hpr −0.004 0.020
(0.021) (0.042)
Observations 435 435 406 427 427 398
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Although the constant term was estimated, it is omitted from presenta-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table (B.7) Country Specic Short-run Estimation Results
Country φ isn πe hpr
Austria −0.102∗∗ 0.019 0.035 −0.044∗
(0.016) (0.056) (0.091) (0.012)
Belgium −0.088∗∗∗ −0.262∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.031
(0.004) (0.047) (0.018) (0.013)
Denmark −0.420∗∗ −0.527 0.526 0.011
(0.033) (0.334) (0.258) (0.006)
Finland −0.512∗∗∗ −0.579∗∗ −0.068∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.016) (0.052) (0.017) (0.008)
France −0.558∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗ 0.028 0.027∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.029) (0.011) (0.001)
Germany −0.586∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
Greece −0.103∗∗ −0.168 0.095 0.075∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.105) (0.044) (0.003)
Ireland −0.652∗∗∗ −1.092∗∗ 0.153∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.171) (0.020) (0.001)
Italy −0.233∗∗∗ −0.155∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.047) 0.003) (0.002)
Japan −0.160∗∗∗ −0.304 0.002 −0.007∗∗
(0.007) (2.157) (0.001) (0.012)
Luxembourg −0.674∗∗ −0.514∗∗ −0.086 −0.202
(0.081) (0.078) (0.049) (0.023)
Netherlands −0.279∗∗∗ −0.673∗∗ −0.034 −0.061∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.059) (0.018) (0.002)
Norway −0.769∗∗∗ −0.447 −0.006 −0.237∗
(0.059) (0.206) (0.011) (0.049)
Portugal −0.154∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗ −0.021 0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.038) (0.019) (0.001)
Spain −0.326∗∗∗ −1.011∗∗ 0.218∗∗ −0.003
(0.010) (0.114) (0.034) (0.001)
Sweden 0.003 0.813∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.078∗∗
(0.006) (0.088) (0.004) (0.0122)
Switzerland −0.584∗∗ −0.265∗ 0.112∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗
(0.050) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
United Kingdom −0.389∗∗∗ −0.745∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗
(0.006) (0.050) (0.002) (0.002)
United States −0.249∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.036) (0.001) (0.002)
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Although the constant term was estimated, it is omitted from presenta-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses.
29




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error-correction (coecient):
φi −0.302∗∗∗ −0.449∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.039) (0.058)
Long-run eect (coecients):
isn 0.338∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.122) (0.093) (0.131)
π −0.515∗∗∗ −0.378∗∗∗ −0.205∗ −0.200∗∗




∆ isn −0.219∗ −0.459∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗ −0.625∗∗
(0.100) (0.098) (0.117) (0.135)
∆ π 0.028 0.063∗ 0.017 0.041
(0.048) (0.032) (0.047) (0.087)
∆ hpr 0.034 0.012
(0.023) (0.030)
Observations 435 406 427 398
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Although the constant term was estimated, it is omitted from presenta-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Error-correction (coecient):
φi −0.337∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.381∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.301∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.065) (0.049) (0.051) (0.085)
Long-run eect (coecients):
iln 0.306∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗
(0.076) (0.065) (0.070) (0.087) (0.070) (0.205)
πe −0.187∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.169∗ −0.058




∆ iln −0.164 −0.225 −0.295 −0.124 −0.172 −0.098
(0.272) (0.275) (0.203) (0.111) (0.282) (0.203)
∆ πe 0.035 0.049 0.053 0.039
(0.038) (0.037) (0.055) (0.053)
∆ hpr −0.010 −0.064
(0.021) (0.025)
Observations 432 432 402 424 424 394
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Although the constant term was estimated, it is omitted from presenta-
tion. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table (B.10) PMG Estimation Result 4:Further Results
Dependent variable:
srg
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Error-correction (coecient):
φi −0.275∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗ −0.603∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.077) (0.064) (0.057) (0.099)
Long-run eect (coecients):
isn 0.825∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.059) (0.064) (0.073) (0.093) (0.056)
πe −0.235∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗
(0.046) (0.061) (0.060) (0.045) (0.040) (0.037)
hpr 0.066∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ 0.016 −0.126∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
t −0.963∗ −0.772∗∗∗ −0.719∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.164) (0.114)







∆ isn −0.299∗ −0.231 −0.528∗∗∗ −0.499∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗ −0.524∗∗
(0.142) (0.118) (0.154) (0.107) (0.130) (0.185)
∆ πe 0.061 0.060 0.120∗∗ 0.055 0.006 0.039
(0.024) (0.032) (0.036) (0.088) (0.032) (0.039)
∆ hpr −0.029 0.009 0.034 0.022 0.030 0.084
(0.025) (0.021) (0.037) (0.039) (0.020) (0.050)
∆ t −0.841∗∗ −0.766∗∗ −1.104∗∗
(0.303) (0.290) (0.403)




∆ gd 0.071∗ 0.043
(0.033) (0.037)
Observations 406 406 329 396 406 396
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Although the constant term was estimated, it is omitted from the pre-
sentation. Standard errors in parentheses. I added not more than three policy variables at the same
time to the benchmark model in order to ensure that there is a sucient number of degrees of freedom
and also to maintain the stability of the model.
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Table (B.11) Country-Specic Diagnostic Test








Austria 0.761 8.608 5.279 0.674 5.478 0.953
Belgium 0.577 2.690 0.738 0.807 2.550 0.985
Denmark 2.410 2.542 0.898 0.414 2.861 0.369
Finland 0.953 0.004 0.263 0.842 2.687 0.828
France 0.680 5.305 3.362 0.317 9.956 0.763
Germany 0.223 0.014 0.916 0.436 5.593 0.953
Greece 2.192 1.881 0.927 0.498 7.601 0.926
Ireland 1.716 0.552 0.060 1.312 1.980 0.563
Italy 0.966 1.725 2.982 2.843 7.039 0.976
Japan 1.203 0.781 1.132 0.684 8.700 0.898
Luxembourg 0.961 0.093 0.930 0.166 9.909 0.264
Netherlands 1.005 1.324 0.399 2.793 4.276 0.853
Norway 2.635 0.440 0.786 0.774 2.740 0.308
Portugal 0.978 0.549 2.050 0.491 6.178 0.956
Spain 1.436 2.800 1.546 0.614 0.998 0.907
Sweden 1.501 2.076 1.782 5.784 1.428 0.891
Switzerland 0.948 2.252 2.243 1.591 6.403 0.706
United Kingdom 1.044 1.058 0.319 0.520 6.836 0.865
United States 0.837 0.793 0.509 0.040 7.763 0.795
Note:







statistics for tests of residual serial correlation, functional form mis-specication, non-normal errors, and
hetroskedasticity . R̄2 is the adjusted multiple correlation coecient.
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Table (B.12) Country-Specic Long-run Estimates
Country φi AIC Lag Selection i
sn πe hpr
Austria -1∗∗ 1,1,0,1 0.865∗∗ -0.302 -0.131∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.230) (0.350) (0.028)
Belgium -0.659∗∗∗ 1,1,0,0 1.586∗∗∗ -0.170 -0.102∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.206) (0.173) (0.020)
Denmark -0.759∗∗ 1,0,0,0 -0.849 0.953 0.032
(0.202) (0.414) (0.789) (0.045)
Finland -0.376∗∗∗ 1,1,0,0 1.059 -1.499 -0.018
(0.060) (0.581) (0.905) (0.064)
France -0.509∗∗ 1,1,0,0 0.441 0.104 -0.015
(0.158) (0.283) (0.427) (0.021)
Germany -0.625∗∗∗ 1,1,0,1 0.282∗∗ -0.159 -0.023∗
(0.154) (0.070) (0.130) (0.010)
Greece -0.422∗ 1,1,0,1 0.773 0.814 0.093
(0.155 ) (0.496) (0.968) (0.067)
Ireland -0.561∗∗∗ 1,1,0,1 -0.404 0.444 0.019
(0.112) (0.467) (0.513) (0.033)
Italy -0.471∗∗∗ 1,1,1,1 1.464∗∗∗ -0.505 -0.016
(0.074) (0.258) (0.306) (0.030)
Japan -0.606∗∗∗ 1,0,1,0 5.498∗∗ -0.128 0.170∗∗∗
(0.138) (1.828) (0.065) (0.032)
Luxembourg -1∗∗ 1,0,0,0 -0.294 -0.197 -0.030
(0.257) (0.220) (0.286) (0.034)
Netherlands -0.891∗∗∗ 1,1,0,0 -0.394∗ -0.095 -0.100∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.168) (0.208) (0.018)
Norway -0.948∗∗ 1,0,0,1 -0.463 -0.060 -0.058
(0.270) (0.450) (0.192) (0.047)
Portugal -0.301∗∗ 1,1,0,0 5.42 -0.253 0.142
(0.078) (0.619) (0.730) (0.63)
Spain -0.491∗∗∗ 1,1,0,0 0.913∗ 0.634 -0.033
(0.099) (0.384) (0.633) (0.026)
Sweden -0.527∗∗∗ 1,0,0,0 1.117 0.002 0.244∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.735) (0.148) (0.060)
Switzerland -0.698∗∗ 1,0,0,0 1.107∗ -0.132 0.011
(0.178) (0.402) (0.106) (0.056)
United Kingdom -0.334∗∗∗ 1,1,1,0 0.453 -0.305 0.010
(0.066) (0.448) (0.147) (0.067)
United States -0.557∗∗∗ 1,0,0,1 -0.226 -0.099∗ -0.045
(0.104) (0.156) (0.044) (0.031)
Note:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Although the constant term was estimated, it is omitted from the pre-
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(h) PMG Model - Ireland














96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Residual Actual Fitted














96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Residual Actual Fitted












07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Residual Actual Fitted














96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Residual Actual Fitted











1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Residual Actual Fitted












96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Residual Actual Fitted














96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Residual Actual Fitted












96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Residual Actual Fitted
(h) PMG Model - Sweden
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(c) PMG Model - United States
Figure (B.4) Country Specic Results, Actual vs Fitted Values, and Residual Plot (Continuation)
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